The widely accepted view on derivatives pricing post-crisis states that -the price of a fully collateralized derivative transaction is obtained by discounting all associated cash flows with the cost of the collateral, while for a non-collateralized derivative transaction the discounting rate should be the cost of unsecured funding of the "issuing" counterparty. The paper examines origins of this view by following three papers, that have received wide acceptance from practitioners as providing the theoretical foundations for it -[Piterbarg 2010], [Burgard and Kjaer 2010] and [Burgard and Kjaer 2013] . The paper reveals several conceptual and technical inconsistencies with the approaches taken in these articles, and in general concludes that none of the statements above either follows from or is required by the no-arbitrage pricing theory, but can amount to arbitrage due to the luck of a market that would clear at XVA-embedded prices.
Introduction
Derivative transactions today come with an attached collateral account and recognition for the inherent counterparty default risk. The post-crisis paradigm for derivatives pricing dictates that collateralized with cash trades should be discounted using the rate payable on the cash collateral, while a bank's own cost of funding should be used for discounting non-collateralized trades. Despite the seemingly bifurcated approach to discounting the two follow a single principle -in both cases the discounting rate is a cost rate for the dealer bank.
Discounting of derivative transactions with the funding cost, however, has been the case for a long time and before the crises (so the post-crisis paradigm is not really new). For many years (indeed decades) Libor was considered to be the cost at which dealer banks would fund themselves unsecured. Over the years, using this unsecured funding rate as the rate that was plugged in for the risk-free rate in the no-arbitrage pricing formulas for derivatives has given Libor the "title" of a risk-free rate. This, of course, was more of a misnomer and belief than an economic reality. Nevertheless, as a result of discounting with the same funding cost by different dealer banks (agreed on through the Libor panel) dealers would land on the same price, giving the impression that derivatives were priced according to a no-arbitrage pricing approach with a law of one price, and trades are discounted with a risk-free rate. By implication then one would be forced to state that the inter-dealer trades were happening in a complete and transparent no-arbitrage market. Libor, however, was still a cost of unsecured funding for the dealer banks, and the single rate implied that all dealer banks have the same credit quality or cost of funding, were they to fund themselves in capital markets instead.
The crises, of course, forced fundamental principles of corporate finance back into practice, whereby the funding cost of each dealer bank is a function of the structure and quality of its balance sheet -capital structure and earning power of assets. This, however, also meant that any transaction in the inter-dealer market is now akin to lending or borrowing as the market mechanism of the inter-dealer markets would not "guarantee" a counterparty on the other end of any trade, thus introducing default risk and the associated costs into the picture.
Although arguments around the inclusion of these costs into derivatives pricing are still ongoing (see for example [Cameron 2013 and White 2012,2016] ) and a fundamental approach (or an approach from the fundamentals) is still missing, the approach in [Piterbarg 2010] , [Burgard and Kjaer 2010] and [Burgard and Kjaer 2013] seems to be an accepted point of view by most major derivatives dealers.
We examine origins of this approach by following the three papers. In Section 2 we examine the treatment of the money account in the approach taken by the three papers. We conclude that no-arbitrage pricing theory neither provides foundations for, nor supports the structures assigned to the money account, and in general each structural element of the money account should be a risk-free account accruing at a risk-free rate. Building on these observations Section 3 demonstrates that the same observations apply to the case of default-risky derivatives and by doing so derives pricing partial differential equations for default-risky derivatives similar to that of a default-risky bond. The main difference between default-risky bonds and derivatives being the bilateral nature of default for derivatives and the derivatives-specific recovery rates, Section 4 elaborates on this two features. It argues that for derivatives to go pari-passu with unsecured senior bonds, derivatives have to be priced as either fully or partially unsecured liabilities, as opposed to fully collateralized trades. Section 4 also argues that the collateral account cannot be either part of the dynamic variables in the replication portfolio, or part of the money account with a non-risk-free rate of accrual. It introduces collateral as part of an exogenous recovery process, treating it through the collateralisation level as a parameter in the valuation formulas for a default-risky derivative.
We conclude with remarks on future research on the introduction of XVAs.
2 On the Nature of the Money Account(s) -No Default Risk [Piterbarg 2010 ] and then [Burgard and Kjaer 2010] , [Burgard and Kjaer 2013] introduced an approach for incorporating costs related to the collateral account and hedging of the counterparty default risk into the price of a derivative. The approach advocated basically amounts to prescribing a structure to the money account, by "taking inspiration" from the costs incurred in managing a typical OTC derivative transaction on a bank's balance sheet.
The no-arbitrage pricing theory being the only mechanism (so far) for pricing collateralized or default-risky derivatives neither provides foundations for, nor supports this "inspiration". More specifically (a) assignment of particular structures to the money account does not follow from or is required by any of the no-arbitrage pricing constraints. Moreover, the cost/funding cash flows are external to the market of securities that enter the replicating portfolio in a standard no-arbitrage approach to pricing.
(b) Inclusion of the collateral account as a component of the money account implies a replication relationship
which, although a mathematical identity, nevertheless, requires that the difference between a derivative and its collateral account be replicable with a position in the underlying and a risk-free asset in the market, which does not follow from any fundamental statement about replicability of a contingent claim.
(c) Also implied is, that what was known as a position in a risk-free asset (and proxied with a money account) can now be looked at as an account on a bank's balance sheet with structural components designed to cover the cost structure of a bank's derivatives position, with each component returning bank-specific premiums dictated by this cost structure.
The way this prescription of a structure to the money account is done seems to be with the purpose of arriving to the premeditated result, which seems to have become "a market consensus" -a fully collateralized derivative transaction should be priced by discounting with the cost of the collateral, and by extension a non-collateralized transaction should be discounted by the cost of unsecured funding of the dealer.
The fact that by design the money account should be a portfolio of risk-free assets according to its part in a no-arbitrage pricing approach 1 and the observations (a) -(c) above warrant a closer look at this prescription of structure to the money account with respect to (i) the "nature" of structural components of the money account,
(ii) the accrual rates on these money account components , and (iii) the overall rate of return on the money account itself.
We start from a most general setup for examining these questions about the money account.
The prescription of a structure to the money account in its most general form can be presented as
2)
are the structural components of the money account accruing at different rates r a , and ρ is a composite rate of return on the overall money account M . Formally, the results in [Piterbarg 2010] , [Burgard and Kjaer 2010] , [Burgard and Kjaer 2013] can be obtained by specifying the terms on the right hand side of the Eqn.2.2 following the cost structures in the papers (See Appendix A).
Let's start by recalling the standard setup of no-arbitrage pricing of derivatives, from which the Black-Scholes-Merton partial differential equation ("BSM PDE") follows ( [Black and Scholes 1973] and [Merton 1973]) . A self-financing arbitrage portfolio Π is set up with a position h V in the derivative and its replicating portfolio, which consists of a position in the underlying -h S and a position in a risk-free security, usually proxied with a money account M . Using the general form of the money account distribution in Eqn.2.2 instantaneous return on such a portfolio when it is delta-hedged (i.e., special weightsh S = −∆h V andh V = h V exist in the market {V, S, M }) is given by
With a zero initial investment -Πh(t) = 0 (z.i.i. constraint henceforth), one has
4)
"restructuring" of the replication portfolio with some redistribution of risk factors and risk-free parts in the arbitrage portfolio, resulting in the same observations. leading to
Requiring the no-arbitrage prices to exist is equivalent to setting the square brackets above to zero, since one has to have
This then yields to
To arrive to a BSM PDE representation of Eqn.2.7, one still has to assume that V = V (t, S(t)) and V (T, S(T )) = Contractual P ayof f ≡ Φ (T, S(T )). After this, using Ito's Lemma produces a PDE form of the Eqn.2.7
The only difference here with the classical BSM equation is the composite rate of return ρ = a M a M r a for the money account. In this sense, the no-arbitrage setup itself does not "fix" the rate of accrual for the money account -only its overall accrual rate enters the equation. It is rather the risk-free nature of the money account that requires the composite rate to be the risk-free rate, rather than anything else.
Studying the structural form of Eqn.2.7 provides additional insights.
Eqn.2.7 is a more fundamental relationship than its BSM PDE representation -it basically states that there is no extra unit of premium to be received (w.r.t. an "arbitrarily" chosen benchmark ρ) for the risk of a derivative position, compared to the outright holding of the underlying position, if the markets are arbitrage-free (and complete).
Combining Eqn.2.5 with the most general form for the money account structure Eqn.2.2 and the z.i.i. constraint Eqn.2.4 for a delta-hedged self-financing portfolio one more time,
one can rewrite the instantaneous return Eqn.2.5 on the arbitrage portfolio as 10) where w a = M a M . Eqn.2.10 can be rewritten to take the following form
(2.11)
Requiring for the arbitrage-free prices to exist (i.e., Eqn.2.6 to hold), leads to the following form of the fundamental relation Eqn.2.7
The extra premium for the same level of risk σ V on the right hand side of Eqn.2.12 is due to the non-zero premiums r a − r = ǫ a ≥ 0 embedded in the components of the money account, and shows that an extra premium can be earned by holding the derivative position instead of the underlying position (with a sign dependent on the relative riskiness of the derivative versus its underlying position 2 ). This would mean that one would be able to hedge all of the σ V in the market for the underlying, and still make the extra premiums on top of a risk-free rate of return, despite the fact that at that point it is a risk free portfolio itself.
One can also look at the Eqn.2.11 slightly differently, leading to the same argument. No-arbitrage pricing is effectively a proof that no-arbitrage prices exist, as opposed to a statement that all securities in a financial market are traded at no-arbitrage prices. However, if the markets are complete and an equilibrium is attainable, then one could state that markets have cleared at noarbitrage prices. If this is the case, then one should put
leading to
(2.14)
For the no-arbitrage prices to clear in this complete market in equilibrium, the instantaneous return on a delta-hedged self-financing portfolio with zero initial investment should be zero with certainty, i.e.
The latter is achievable if r a − r = 0, f or all a , and ρ = r. (2.16)
In other words, if one has assumed that M a structural components of the money account are risk-free, then all components M a must accrue at the risk-free rate r to avoid arbitrage 3 -several portfolios, presumed to be risk free, are returning at persistently non-zero premiums with respect to each other.
Notice, however, that although we are referring to Eqn.2.11 and Eqn.2.14 as arbitrage, the more accurate statement would be that the market {V, S, M } does not clear the equilibrium (no-arbitrage) relation Eqn.2.12
Eqn.2.12 would be an arbitrage if the last term on its left hand side was generated by any of the market priced securities of the replicating portfolio in the {V, S, M } market.
Observations above could be summarized as follows (i) each structural element of the money account should be a risk-free account,
(ii) each of the structural elements should accrue at a risk-free rate, and (iii) all these risk-free rates should be the same.
In XVA literature the money account is sometimes also "constructed" bottom-up, i.e. first its components are defined and accrual rates are assigned, then the sum of the components is defined as the money account -a M a := M . Recall, however, that for the delta-hedged portfolio Πh the z.i.i. constraint looks as
So if the {V, S, M } market clears, then the following should hold
for the z.i.i. constraint Eqn.2.18 to hold. Moreover, the z.i.i. constraint in Eqn.2.18 only "fixes" the size of the money account M (implied by the feasible replicability relationships in a given market) and does not prescribe any structure M a to it. Furthermore, the money account can have any structure as long as the observations (i) -(iii) are satisfied.
We mention in passing, that the observations about the money account structure and its components can also be obtained following the equilibrium arguments of CAPM, which is not surprising since no-arbitrage can be looked at as a weak form of market equilibrium. Furthermore, it also follows that in the case of no risk-free assets in the market the money account and its components can only be zero-beta portfolios, accruing at the same single rate of return for a zero-beta portfolio ( [Black 1972] ) .
It is also clear from the observations above, that the collateral account cannot be part of the replicating portfolio -either as part of the risky positions (the hedge) it "prices" no risk factor, or the money account -it's accruing at a non-risk-free rate.
In the next section we show that the observations (i) -(iii) about the money account and its components also hold for the case of default-risky derivatives.
Pricing Derivatives with Counterparty Risk
We start from the widely accepted assumption that the value of a traded derivative depends on the bi-lateral default risk of the counterparties involved
The setup 4 of a self-financing arbitrage portfolio Π h consists of hV quantity of a derivative instrument on a security S, with its replicating portfolio consisting of h S quantity of the security, h B quantity of risky bonds P − B issued by the counterparty B, h A quantity of risky bonds P − A issued by counterparty A and an amount M (t) of money account 5 . The value of this portfolio at time t is
with the instantaneous return given in terms of gain processes as
The gain dynamics of the portfolio positions are defined as
Here R A and R B are the recovery rates for the senior unsecured bonds issued by counterparties A and B respectively 6 , and ∆V B and ∆V A are changes in the value of the derivative position due to default by the counterparty B and counterparty A, respectively:
Plugging Eqn.3.4 into the instantaneous return equation Eqn.3.3 yields to the following
Observe now, that ∆V Â V and ∆V B V are negative numbers and are the percentage drops in the value of the derivative position due to defaults by A and B, respectively. Hence, define recovery rates χ B,A for the derivative position as
We further introduce the loss ratios z A,B as the ratio of loss rates from derivative to loss rates from bond positions as
Rewriting Eqn.3.6 with these new notations one arrives to
With the z.i.i. constraint
the portfolio weights h ′ are chosen (the market V , S, P A , P B , M clears ) to satisfy
Plugging into Eqn.3.9 one arrives to the following expression for the instantaneous return on such portfolio
It is easy to see now, that an investment strategỹ
holding components of which satisfy the z.i.i. constraint Eqn.3.10
14)
will make instantaneous return on such portfolio equal to
with certainty.
We rewrite the delta-hedging weights explicitly for a later usẽ
17)
Satisfying the no-arbitrage conditions
is now equivalent to setting
If one agrees that the money account should accrue at the risk free rate ρ = r, and the market is frictionless (no material liquidity premiums) and risk-neutrally priced, then 
where
is the expected return on an otherwise identical default-risk-free derivative V (t, S(t)).
Eqn.3.21 states that if the trading between two default-risky counterparties can be looked at as bilateral exchange of bonds that are traded in the same markets (mutually shorting bonds), then after a market-priced adjustment for the bilateral default risk there is no extra unit of premium to be obtained for holding a derivative position, instead of the outright holding of the underlying position, if the markets are arbitrage-free (and complete).
For the case with bilateral default risk, prescription of the structure to the money account M , using the anzats Eqn.2.2 leads to the following form of the fundamental relation Eqn.3.21, which does not hold
There simply is no market that clears the no-arbitrage prices of a derivative and its replicating portfolio, such that the fundamental relationship Eqn.3.21 for default-risky derivatives would hold in the form of Eqn.3.22 between the risk premia in that market.
Eqn.3.21 can also be written in a PDE presentation using Ito's Lemma forV µV andV σV in the standard form, to arrive to
where, for the brevity of the expressions, we have adopted the notation
Again, if one is working with risk-neutrally priced markets whereby money market accounts accrue at the risk free rate
The Feynman-Kač solutions for Eqn.3.25 looks aŝ
if one defines the terminal condition for it asV (T, S(T )) = Contractual P ayof f ≡ Φ(T, S(T )). Eqn.3.25 can also be re-written as (3.27) resulting in a different form of the Feynman-Kač solution
The following observations are in order.
(A). Eqn.3.25 and Eqn.3.27 that price default risky derivatives are also the equations that price default risky bonds. Notice, that only contractual cashflows enter the expressions. Differences with pricing a risky bond are only:
-the bi-lateral nature of the default event, and 8 Again, notice that λA,B are not the same as in [Burgard and Kjaer 2010] , as rC = r.
-the recovery rate for a derivative.
(B). If a) the derivative positions go pari-passu with the unsecured senior debt of the defaulted counterparty (which they do), and b) we are interpreting the recovery rates R A and R B as the recovery percentage per dollar of a senior unsecured exposure, then this also implies that χ A = R A and χ B = R B (or z A,B = 1 in the hedge ratios) 9 .
(C). The money market account in the case of default-risky derivatives is simply a "bigger account" compared to the case of non-default-risky derivatives pricing of BSM
The two components of the money account are there to "simply re-balance" the deviations between derivative's value and delta hedge of the underlying, and the deviations between derivative's value and delta hedge of counterparty defaults, respectively -they are of the same risk-free nature as the money account as a whole, and are accruing at the same risk-free rate.
The next section takes a closer look at the two main differences with the case of default-risky bond pricing.
Bilateral Default, Recovery Rates for Derivatives and Collateral
We started from an assumption that the price of a derivative depends on the bilateral default risk of the counterparties involved (Eqn.3.1). This assumes that in general a derivative (its contractual payoff function) may generate liability cashflows for both counterparties.
However, if the payoff function (contractual cashflows) of a derivative either gives rise to liability cashflows to only one of the counterparties, or the liability cashflows of counterparties are separable HereV A andV B are the values (prices) of a derivative, the payoff function of which is the stream of liability cashflows due from the counterparty A and counterparty B, respectively.
In general, where separability of liability cashflows does not hold (i.e.,V A andV B cannot be defined explicitly), one needs a more general form of the Eqn.3.25, the Feynman-Kač solution for which can be written aŝ
with the simplified notations D r (t, T ) = e Estimation ofv A andv B depends on the applicability or existence of one of the two recovery mechanisms -replacement, or recovery.
In a replacement paradigm the following two cases are of interest. Case 1. Assume -there is a market mechanism for guaranteeing a replacement counterparty (in general both for defaulted and solvent counterparties) and all market participants pay the same price for a given contractual stream of cashflows.(The precrisis setup.)
In this case
• the derivative contractV (u) =V (T − (t + u), S(u)) at any intermediate time t = u can be replaced by an identical one with any other counterparty during the life of the derivative,
• and because noŵ
3)
• the default-risk adjustments in the Feynman-Kač solution Eqn.4.2 vanish andV (t, S(t), J A ,
, T )Φ(T, S(T ))] = V (t, S(t)), i.e. default-risky free value.
This outcome is equivalent to relaxing the assumption that the price of a derivative that promises a given stream of cashflow depends on the default risk of the counterparties trading it.
The experience of the 2007-2009 financial crisis showed that the existence of a replacement market mechanism can be a material and key assumption (or presumption).
Case 2. Assume -there is no market mechanism for guaranteeing a replacement counterparty, but it is possible to replace the derivative contract with an identical one with another solvent counterparty C, and the price at which this replacement is available depends (bilaterally) on the default risk of the parties involved.(The post-crisis setup.)
IfV X,Y is the value of a (default-risky) derivative contract that pays Φ(T, S(T )) at maturity between counterparties X and Y , then one can put
With these notations one then has for the Feynman-Kač solution Eqn.4.2
One can also rewrite Eqn.4.7 aŝ
The last term can be interpreted as the replacement cost of replacing the derivative contract with an identical one with counterparty C 10 . Notice, however, that there is no feasible way of knowing the new counterparty C a priori, and it will not be possible to transact at an unknown "exit price".
When either
10 It is interesting to ask the question what is the sum of all these pairwise costs equal for a market - V A,C (u)λB(u) +VB,C (u)λA(u) .
(a) there is no market mechanism that guarantees a counterparty that allows pricing derivatives as default-risk-free, making the loss zero -v A,B (u) =V (u), or (b) there are market participants, but the replacement counterparty is not known a priori and the loss amountV (u) −v A,B (u) is ill-defined, collateral agreements can be put in place to ascertain recovery levels in default.
This, however, requires a change of paradigm from replacement to recovery.
In the recovery paradigm collateralization does not have to make the recovery rate equal to one, it just has to make the recovery levels as predictable as possible. It is part of the (generally exogenous) process of estimating the recovery rates, the level of which depends on the structure and quality of the defaulted counterparty's balance sheet -capital structure and residual value of assets.
Furthermore, the recovery rates χ for the derivatives have to be adjusted for collateral to make the estimated recovery rates that of an unsecured senior debt, so that at default the mark-to-market valuesV can go pari-passu with the unsecured senior debt. Only for such cases one can use the senior unsecured bond recovery rates R A,B for defining the cashflows from counterparty A and counterparty B when one of them is in default.
When there is no collateral, use of unsecured senior debt recovery rates leads to the following recovery rates for derivative positionŝ
Using Eqn.4.9 one arrives to a familiar expression for Eqn.4.2
In the case of collateralization the recovery estimations can be presented as follows.
If we assume netted collateral posting and collection, then there is a C(u) amount of collateral available to the solvent party at the time of default. If the position is over-collateralized (V (u) < C(u)), then recovery is the value of the derivative, otherwise it is the collateral amount plus recovery from the unsecured portion -C(u)+R A,B (V (u)−C(u)). This can be presented in a combined manner as follows 11
Here x + = max(x, 0) and x − = min(x, 0). Thus, one arrives to the collateral-adjusted form of the main Eqn.3.25
This leads to collateral-adjusted derivatives recovery ratesχ
with the corresponding Feynman-Kač solution 
If the posted collateral is not allowed to be netted (e.g., when initial margins are involved) the collateralization level k acquires a counterparty subscript -
the level of collateralization includes the initial margin collateral amount I A,B posted by the other counterparty.
With a non-netted initial margin the Feynman-Kač expression Eqn.4.18 obtains the following form 12
In summary:
-default-risky derivatives should be priced with respect to the unsecured recovery rates, if they are to be pari-passu with the senior unsecured debt,
-the collateral account cannot be part of the dynamic variables in the replicating portfolios, it is part of an exogenously estimated parameter -the recovery rate 13 .
The latter makes intuitive sense, since there were no market-priced securities in the replicating portfolio that priced the recovery risk directly at all states of the world. For the same reason it does not help introducing new dynamic risk factors to reflect the risk in the recovery rates R A and R B . If the market where the self-financing replicating portfolio is set up does not have securities that are perfectly correlated with risk factors, this constitutes an incomplete market and leads to a semi-replication. Consequently, as is generally the case for such risks, the recovery risk can only be mitigated, not fully hedged (non-replicable) through means outside the derivative transaction, which generally involves collateralization or guarantees.
This semi-replication should not be confused with the case in [Burgard and Kjaer 2013] . The latter approach cannot be called a semi-replication as it simply amounts to "voluntary" under-hedging of the default risk of the "issuer" of the derivative by choosing different than the fully replicating weights -V − g A = F ullHedgeW eight − ǫ, taking "inspiration from funding considerations". In other words, the market in [Burgard and Kjaer 2013] is still complete 14 .
This is easily observed if one rewrites the full replication weightsh in Eqn.3.16 -3.18 in notations of [Burgard and Kjaer 2013] 
, with h ′V = 1, leading tõ
Not choosing the full replication weightsh creates an arbitrage opportunity between holding a derivative position of a counterparty against a portfolio of its bonds. We discuss the approach in [Burgard and Kjaer 2013] in Appendix B with more details, as it is used widely for deriving XVA expressions (see, for example [Green and Kenyon 2015] ).
Returning to Eqn.4.19, it is also important to note that its second and third terms are simply two parts of one thing -a risk-neutral expected loss term for the case of bilateral default, separated only due to the non-netted initial margins. This terms should not be confused with the CV A and DV A terms in the XVA literature, which are bank-specific accounting adjustments estimated using non-risk-neutral measures. If there is an actively traded market in the default-risky instrumentV , then it will be recognized on the balance sheet at its fair valueV , with no adjustments necessary. If there is no such market, or there is an actively trading market in identical risk-free instrument V , then it will be recognized on the balance sheet at the fair value V , but with bank-specific accounting adjustments known as CV A using non-risk-neutral measures.
Regardless of how the adjustments are calculated (risk-neutral or not 15 ) the CVA for a bilateral default should be considered a single contra-asset, instead of being split into two pieces and called CV A and DV A, as is presented in the XVA literature. The mechanism of generating a DVA is very different, it has a "balance sheet origin" and generally speaking has nothing to do with valuation of an asset or a liability instrument (a funding liability is different from a derivative liability in many ways 16 ).
And finally, collateralization can also play a systemic role.
One could redefine the closeout rules to limit the entitlement of the derivatives recovery exclusively to the recovery from collateral accounts, with no further recourse to the assets of the defaulted counterparty. The systemic relevance of such a setup would be the decoupling of derivatives trading from the rest of bank's deposit funded balance sheet (e.g., no ring-fencing would be necessary) 17 .
Closing Remarks
Following the approach in [Piterbarg 2010] and [Burgard and Kjaer 2013] market participants have generated adjustments to derivatives pricing formulas to reflect funding and hedging costs, collectively referred to as XVAs (Several books have also been written on XVAs already -[XVA Books]). In a separate effort [Brigoét al 2017] show that these costs can be recovered if they are assigned as dividends to market securities. However, in either approach there seems to be no market that would clear these dividend components as part of a no-arbitrage price for a derivative. Moreover, since they are not "originating" from the contractual cashflows of the derivative or its underlying securities market, these dividends would still amount to what's referred to as "donations" in [Andersen, Duffie and Song 2017] .
Recently, there have been notable attempts to bring XVAs into the corporate finance and accounting frameworks (see for example [Andersen, Duffie and Song 2017] and [Albaneseét al 2014 [Albaneseét al , 2015 ).
In a forthcoming paper we will discuss the results of these efforts and will formulate an approach for recovering XVAs as P&L measures of balance sheet consumption by a derivative transaction on a bank's balance sheet, with no reference to no-arbitrage pricing (see also [Brigo 2018] ).
References
A Money Accounts in [Piterbarg 2010 ] & [Burgard and Kjaer 2010] We explicitly expand the money accounts in [Piterbarg 2010] and [Burgard and Kjaer 2010] .
To arrive to the results of [Piterbarg 2010 ]
one has to solve the z.i.i. constraint (Eqn.2.9) with hV = −1, and add and subtract the collateral account
The addition and subtraction of the collateral account generates the money account components M R , M F and M C which are then assigned accrual rates r a , a = C, F, R, motivated by the following cost structure:
M R = −∆S amount of the underlying security borrowed at the repo rate r R , with dividend income of δ;
M F = V − C amount to be borrowed/lent unsecured from the treasury desk for collateral, which accrues at the funding rate of r F dM F = r F M F dt;
M C = C the collateral account that accrues at the collateral rate of r C ;
For the money account in [Piterbarg 2010 ] the standard no-arbitrage conditions in Eqn.2.6 lead to
which means that one needs to put Eqn.A.5 states that the "portfolio of funding accounts" that gives the money account a structure in [Piterbarg 2010 ] has to be a risk-free (or zero beta ) portfolio.
The arguments above apply to the case of [Burgard and Kjaer 2010] with the following definitions for the money account components.
• Split the funding component M F of the money account into two pieces to account for any surplus or shortfall cash held by the seller after the own bonds have been purchased:
surplus cash held by the seller after the own bonds have been purchased accruing at risk-free rate r;
shortfall that needs to be funded through borrowing, at the financing rate of
• M R = −∆S an account for the underlying security borrowed, accruing at the repo rate q, provides a dividend income of δ;
• M C an account for the proceeds of shorting the counterparty bond through a repurchase agreement at rate r (it is assumed that the haircut in this repo is zero, so that the repo rate for the counterparty bond can be replaced with a risk-free rate)
With these notations equations Eqn.A.3 -Eqn.A.5 follow for the case of [Burgard and Kjaer 2010] .
B The Case of Semi-Replication in [Burgard and Kjaer 2013] We need to discuss the semi-replication approach introduced in [Burgard and Kjaer 2013] , since this approach is used widely for deriving KVA and MVA expressions (as in [Green and Kenyon 2015] ). The approach cannot be called a semi-replication as it simply amounts to under-hedging the default risk of the "issuer" of the derivative by choice.
We will apply the no-arbitrage pricing methodology above to [Burgard and Kjaer 2013] , to show that the approach in this paper allows arbitrage.
B.1 Semi-Replication -a Misnomer [Burgard and Kjaer 2013] set up a "hedge portfolio" Π (not the same as Π h above) as
with a strategy that V +Π = 0. 18 . Then Ψ := V +Π is the arbitrage portfolio Π h above with h V = 1.
[ Burgard and Kjaer 2013] introduce a money account distribution as M = M S +M B , where M S and M B are assumed to be "financing" the S and P B positions respectively. The latter interpretation provides the justification for extra constraints
With Eqn.B.2 the z.i.i. constraint for Ψ looks as follows
Using Eqn.B.2, the dynamics of the money accounts M S and M B are assigned rates of return along lines of the financing arguments, with q and q B the repo rates for financing the S and P B positions:
(B.4) [Burgard and Kjaer 2013] then write the instantaneous return for Ψ as a self-financing portfolio
Plugging in the price dynamics into Eqn.B.5 and using the notations from [Burgard and Kjaer 2013] for
Now, recalling Eqn.B.3 and choosing R B = 0 ⇒ P D B = 0 leads to the following expression for
where we have used ∆V A = g A − V .
One can of course require that all the terms in Eqn.B.7 be set equal to zero, however, we will follow the paper by setting
, and (B.9)
With these new notations, for the delta-hedged portfolio Ψ = V + Π one can write then
Using the expression for µ V V , adopting the notations r B − q B = λ B 20 , s C = r C − r, ǫ = P D A − C + g A and using the remaining z.i.i constraint Eqn.B.3 one arrives to the following main expression of [Burgard and Kjaer 2013] 
Notice, that at this point there is no particular reason for choosing RB = 0. 20 Note that λ here is different from the one in previous sections, it is defined with respect to qB.
[ Burgard and Kjaer 2013] state that "We assume that the issuer wants the strategy described above to evolve in a self-financed fashion while he is alive", and that "This implies that the issuer requires the total drift term of dV + dΠ to be zero."
This produces a PDE in [Burgard and Kjaer 2013] from which XVA expressions in the literature are derived and interpreted by others (e.g., [Green and Kenyon 2015] ).
Let's notice now that the no-arbitrage conditions for the self-financing portfolio Ψ = V + Π with Ψ(t) = 0 would imply that arbitrage exists even if one sets the drift term in Eqn.B.12 to zero, since the probability of default for the counterparty A is non-zero -P rob[dJ A = 1] > 0, and there is always an ǫ such that To summarize:
• the ǫ shift off of the full replication ratio for the counterparty A does not come from any no-arbitrage constraints,
• it is simply (voluntary) under-hedging and not a semi-replication.
Furthermore, there is no reason for the specific choice of the bonds in [Burgard and Kjaer 2013] .
B.2 Semi-replication with a Generic Bond Portfolio
There is no reason for the specific choices of the bonds and their recoveries in [Burgard and Kjaer 2013] , the full replication is achievable with any portfolio of counterparty A bonds.
To see this we will approach it from a more general setting. Assume the counterparty A above has issued n bonds P ) i.e. the loss in value of the derivative due to the default by counterparty A is restored by the recovery from a short position in the portfolio bonds issued by the counterparty A.
Notice, that it is not the individual weights in the portfolio of bonds (consequently, not the seniority or other characteristics of each of the issue) that matter, but rather the total amount of the debt holdings. 
